We analyze the impacts of bioenergy trade on greenhouse gas emissions using a two-good, three-factor model. Bioenergy is an agricultural good used as a substitute for fossil fuels in industry. Governments tax domestic pollution without international coordination. We assume that northern countries have higher labor productivity than southern ones and that agriculture is less pollution intensive than industry (after taxation). We show that whereas southern countries impose a lower tax rate than northern ones, they do not necessary have a competitive advantage in industry, and that compared to autarky, trade liberalization either increases or decreases worldwide emissions depending on regional comparative advantages.
Introduction
The potential of bioenergy in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuels has recently stimulated both the scientic and the political debate (von Lampe, 2006) . Bioenergy is a relatively clean renewable alternative to fossil fuels but as an agricultural product (e.g. ethanol and biodiesel), it competes for land and feedstock with food production. 1 Moreover, although its use does not emit additional GHG, its production does through the use of fertilizers or chemicals and through the conversion of grasslands and forested lands. Liberalizing trade of bioenergy could worsen this eect or allow industries to reduce GHG emissions by reducing fossil fuel use.
This paper examines the potential impacts of bioenergy trade, with a focus on the resulting worldwide GHG emissions. We determine the trade equilibrium of a global economy with many countries belonging to two regions, North and South, facing global pollution with no international coordination. The two regions only dier in their eective labor endowment, Northern labor being more productive. Each economy is composed of two sectors, agriculture and industry, that emit GHG. The agricultural sector produces both a nal good and an intermediate product, bioenergy. In this sector, pollution arises as an increasing and convex function of land use. Pollution in the other sector, industry, is proportional to the use of fossil fuels. We restrict parameter values so that industry is the pollution intensive sector.
We have two major conclusions. First, we show that in equilibrium the richer country, which imposes higher environmental taxes, may have a comparative advantage in the pollution intensive sector. This possibility arises because of industrial producers' ability to substitute bioenergy for fossil fuels. The second result is that trade may increase or decrease the worldwide level of GHG emissions. The direction of eect depends on which country has a comparative advantage in the dirty sector in trade. A key result is that 1 For instance, to meet a 10 % share of biofuels in domestic transport fuel consumption, the U.S., Canada and the E.U would need to use 30 %, 36 % and 72 % of their agricultural lands respectively (von Lampe, 2006) . 2 Emissions from land conversion vary depending on the quality of land, on the history of past land-uses and on the amount of carbon sequestrated in the soil and the biomass (Schneider, 2007) . A rst impact of land conversion is the release of carbon sequestrated in the soil and the biomass (Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008) . A second impact is the reduced sequestration capacity of agricultural land compared to grassland and forest (Birdsey, 1992) . the change in national emissions caused by trade is always greater in South than in North. This result implies that if South has a comparative advantage in industry, trade increases worldwide emissions, whereas if North has a comparative advantage in industry, trade decreases worldwide emissions. We nd that North is more likely to have a comparative advantage in industry if bioenergy and fossil fuels are close substitute and if marginal emissions in agriculture rise sharply with land use expansion.
Trade always increases emissions in one region and decreases emissions in the other region. The eect is more pronounced in South than in North, which leads to our contrasting results on worldwide emissions. The reason is as follows. Governments set their environmental regulations independently, taking the other countries' emissions as given. Since North has more eective units of labor, in equilibrium it has a higher income than South. Hence, pollution taxes are always higher in North than in South in equilibrium. We show that regional taxes (and wages) dier in free trade, i.e. the Factor Price Equalization theorem (FPE) does not hold due to the non-linearity of agricultural emissions. As a result, if North exports industrial goods, industry shifts to North where the cleaner technique leads to less aggregate pollution. This eect outweighs the increase in emissions coming from agricultural expansion in South. If, instead, South exports industrial goods, its emissions rise and the global environment deteriorates.
Our set-up is close to Copeland & Taylor (1995) , who nd that trade increases worldwide emissions when South has a comparative advantage in the dirty sector and when environmental taxes do not equalize across regions. Our model, however, diers from theirs in two respects. First, the nature of pollution is dierent across sectors: Whereas industrial emissions are proportional to the use of fossil fuels, agricultural pollution is a convex function of land use. Second, one sector produces both a nal good and an intermediate good, as in Vanek (1963) , that is used by industry to reduce pollution. These dierences also distinguish our set-up from Copeland & Taylor (1997 , 2003 , who nd that trade impacts on worldwide pollution depend on the patterns of trade. Whereas they consider specic factor models, our set-up can be restated as a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek trade model with labor and pollution as inputs and with decreasing returns in agriculture.
3 Chua (2003) shows 3 Copeland & Taylor (1997) consider economies with two polluting sectors of dierent emissions intensities, but labor (capital) is used only by the less (most) pollution intensive that if there is an abatement sector, the region with the highest environmental tax may have a comparative advantage in the emission-intensive good. An increase in the environmental tax increases the returns of the most intensive factor in the abatement sector. The tax thus aects dierently the production costs of the two nal-good sectors depending on their respective factor intensities. Chua (2003) considers the impacts of exogenous tax rates on autarky prices, whereas we allow tax rates to be endogenous and solve for the free trade equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 examines the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 considers the eects of trade on the environment. The last section contains concluding remarks.
The model
Consider a world economy with two regions (North and South), composed of many countries : n in North and n * in South. In the rest of the paper, we index by ′′ * ′′ the variables corresponding to southern countries. 4 All countries within a region are identical. The population size of each country is normalized to 1, but the labor force is more productive in North, leading to a higher eective labor in North than in South: L > L * . Each economy is composed of two sectors: agriculture (A) and industry (M ). Both sectors are responsible for GHG emissions, a pollutant leading to global warming and aecting the welfare of the world population. Industry pollutes through the use of fossil fuels. Agriculture indirectly pollutes through the use of land. The agricultural product can be used either as anal food product (F ) for consumers or as an intermediate product, bioenergy (B) , which enters the production process of industry, with A = F + B.
Industry M requires both labor (L M ) and energy as inputs, the latter being a mix of fossil energy (E) and bioenergy. Industrial emissions (Z M ) are proportional to the use of fossil fuels; carbon content is normalized to 1, so that Z M = E. Equivalently, we may consider that there are three inputs: labor, pollution and bioenergy. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production sector. In Copeland & Taylor (2003) , labor and capital are used by both sectors, but only one pollutes. 4 Most of the computations are made for a northern country but are valid for a southern one unless otherwise indicated. function in the industrial production, we get
where 0 < α < 1 indexes the share of energy uses and 0 < e < 1 the share of bioenergy in the energy mix.
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The production of A units of agricultural goods is described by
where L A corresponds to labor and K A to land, and where 0 < µ < 1 is the output elasticity of land. Land use K A generates Z A = ψ(K A ) units of GHG emissions with ψ ′ > 0 and ψ ′′ > 0. In the following, we assume
A /σ, with ζ > 0 and σ > 1. The convexity of the agricultural emission function reects the fact that land conversion reduces the carbon sequestration capacity of soil at an increasing rate, the equilibrium level of carbon in cropland soils being lower than in pasture, which is itself lower than in mature forests (Birdsey, 1992) . While some of the carbon released by soil conversion is captured back by the agricultural land in the long run, there are nevertheless losses in the carbon sequestration capacity of soils that correspond to net GHG emissions due to agricultural expansion. 6 It is possible to restate the production process in agriculture as using labor and GHG emissions according to the relation
which will prove convenient when comparing agriculture with industry. However, (3) cannot be used interchangeably with (2) in solving the problem of the agricultural producer. Indeed, as a function of labor and GHG emissions, (3) exhibits decreasing returns to scale while (2), the relevant production function which involves land and labor as inputs, exhibits constant returns to scale. This dierence is of course due to the convexity of the emission function in agriculture.
We assume that GHG emissions harm only consumers. To reduce emissions, governments adopt sectoral policies using sector-specic taxes on input uses: fossil fuel tax τ for the industry and land tax τ A for agriculture.
7 The trade-o for industrial producers is between paying the environmental tax and abating pollution, i.e. substituting bioenergy and labor for pollution.
To abstract from consideration of stock depletion, we assume that energy and land are available in both regions without restriction. Therefore, the fossil fuel price and the land price correspond to their respective tax: τ and τ A .
8 As emissions are proportional to the use of fossil fuels, the tax on fossil fuels τ equals the carbon tax.
Denote by w the eective labor wage and consider that the agricultural good is the numeraire (i.e. p A = 1). Labor being perfectly mobile within a country (but immobile across countries), the wage is identical across sectors. Given that p A = 1, the unit-cost of the representative rm in industry simplies to
where
α is a constant, and where ξ ≡ (1 − e)α/(1 − eα) corresponds to the relativeoutput elasticity of fossil fuels in the following sense. For a given level of biofuel use, consider the increase in industrial production due to simultaneous equal marginal increases in labor and fossil fuels: it is given by the sum of the output elasticities of fossil fuels and labor, (1 − e)α and 1 − α respectively. The relative contribution of fossil fuels in this increase is given by ξ (and 1 − ξ = (1 − α)/(1 − eα) corresponds to the contribution of labor). Observe that ξ also corresponds to the share of the fossil fuel tax in the industrial cost net of biofuel expenditure, i.e., 8 We assume that the government possesses all the information necessary to tax the carbon content of fossil energy used in industry and the land used in agriculture without cost.
i.e.:
The total cost of producing A is Ac A (w, τ A ), where
and where
, which leads to:
The share of the environmental tax in the production cost corresponds to the output elasticity of land, i.e.,
Using (3), the output elasticity of GHG emissions in agriculture is given by µ/σ. Comparing ξ and µ allows us to measure the sectoral wealth eects due to GHG emissions while the dierence between ξ and µ/σ compares the relative productive eciency of GHG emissions in each sector. As pollution is transboundary, consumers' utility is aected by world pollution Z w , the sum of the emissions of North and South :
Regional variables are indexed by superscripts N for North and S for South. As countries are identical within a region, we have Z N = nZ with Z = Z M + Z A for North. The utility of the representative consumer is given by:
where D A and D M are the quantities of goods consumed, with
We assume that β > 0 and γ ≥ 1 to ensure that the marginal willingness to pay for abating pollution is a nondecreasing function of world pollution. The corresponding expenditure function is:
,
, hence b A and b M correspond to the budget shares of food and industrial goods respectively. The balanced budget constraint implies that national expenses E(ū, Z w ) should not exceed national revenue I. Assuming the proceeds of the environmental taxes are redistributed to consumers through a lump-sum transfer, we have
Due to the transborder nature of the externality, optimality is not achieved without international coordination. A Nash equilibrium results from the absence of negotiation, each government dening Z M and Z A for its country while considering the emissions from all other countries as exogenous. It imposes taxes on fossil fuels and on land so that the utility of the representative consumer is maximized. Dierentiating the balanced budget constraint E(ū, Z w ) = I allows us to determine the eects of small emission variations dZ M and dK A around their optimal levels. We have, neglecting price eects
At the optimum, dū = 0, which leads to the conditions
Environmental taxes increase with national income and worldwide emissions. The environment is thus a normal good. The land tax also increases with the amount of land used and is equivalent to a (Pigouvian) tax on agricultural emissions: we have
Farmers, however, have to pay a tax proportional to the marginal emission level ψ
A , which increases with K A since σ > 1.
By implementing τ and τ A the government implicitly denes the emissions supply of the country: using (12) and
9 Price eects cancel out through market equilibrium conditions in autarky. When considering trade, the same equations hold as long as the government policy has no impact on international prices, i.e. the number of countries is large. We thus abstract from the use of environmental policies as commercial levies.
which depends on the eective labor endowment. Pollution demands are derived from (5)- (10) and (14). We obtain
for agriculture and industry respectively. Observe that the pollution intensity in agriculture is smaller the higher the elasticity of land use emission σ. This is the result of the optimal land tax which, given (14), is such that τ A K A = στ Z A . Although the marginal taxes on emissions are the same (as noted above), the total tax on land use is higher than its equivalent in terms of carbon emissions because σ > 1. Comparing (16) and (17), the industry is relatively pollution intensive and agriculture labor intensive if
H1 which is assumed in the rest of the paper. For e = 0 (no substitution between fossil energy and bioenergy), ξ = α and H1 is satised if µ < α. Hence, when it is impossible to substitute bioenergy for fossil fuels, agriculture is cleaner than industry if the output elasticity of land in agriculture is lower than the output elasticity of energy in industry. However, when e is large, close to 1, i.e. for an industry highly intensive in bioenergy, ξ is very close to 0 and µ must be very low and σ very large for agriculture to be cleaner than industry. Empirical evidence supports the assumption that agriculture is less pollution intensive than industry, although it is not pollution-free.
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It is easily obtained that H1 implies ξ > µ/σ, i.e. that the (relative) output elasticity of GHG emissions is larger in industry than in agriculture.
At equilibrium, demand and supply are equal. Pollution demand is related to the consumers' consumption of goods which depends on the openness 10 Schipper et al. (2001) show that agriculture is less carbon intensive than the manufacturing industries in several developed countries. Carbon intensities are measured by the amount of carbon per value added in each sector in 1994. Estimates in the manufacturing sector are 210 gC/USD in Denmark, 127 gC/USD in France, and 267 gC/USD in the U.S., whereas in agriculture they are 110, 37 and 50 respectively. Since the estimates are based on energy consumption, they omit emissions from land use changes and deforestation, in particular the carbon debt that represents approximately 17 to 123 times more carbon emissions than the annual savings of fossil fuel replacement from biofuel (Fargione et al., 2008) . Schneider & Smith (2009) also show that emissions intensities vary with agricultural practices and land management changes.
to trade of the countries. As a benchmark, we rst investigate the case of autarky. We then detail the eects of trade.
Autarky and comparative advantages
Under autarky, both regions consume only locally produced goods. Market equilibria give (13) and (14), lead to the pollution demand from each sector:
Consequently, the national demand of pollution is given by
Pollution demands depend on the world pollution level and on parameters that are the same in both regions. Hence, despite their dierence in income, northern and southern emission levels are the same under autarky:
. This result is due to the combination of xed shares of income spent in nal good consumption and of xed shares of production cost spent in environmental taxes (Cobb-Douglas functional forms).
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Expressions (18), (19) and (20) show that the GHG emissions of a country decrease with the worldwide emissions level Z w .
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The resulting world level of GHG emissions under autarky is given by
Consequently, we have the following result:
11 Because North is richer, its economies have a larger scale than in South, which tends to increase emissions (scale eect). North, however, is also more prone to tax pollution, which makes its production cleaner (technical eect). These two eects exactly oset each other in the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. This functional form also implies constant shares of expenses in the nal goods, thus there is no composition eect at work in autarky (see Copeland and Taylor 2003 for a more detailed presentation of these eects).
12 As Z w is the sum of emissions of all countries, the levels given by (18), (19) and (20) are dened only implicitly: these equations do not correspond to best reply functions" of a particular country to the GHG emissions strategy of the other countries. Proposition 1. Under autarky, northern and southern countries use the same amount of land and emit the same level of pollution.
Under autarky, pollution is not a distinctive pattern for North and South: sector emissions of GHG are identical from one country to another. Of course, as eective labor endowments in South are lower than in North, emission intensities are larger in South than in North. Using (8), (13), (14) and (15), we obtain that Proposition 2. Under autarky, relative factor prices are higher in North:
, and the environmental taxes and the national income are higher in North:
1−µ > 1, whereas the eective labor wage is lower in North:
Because of a larger eective labor endowment, income and environmental taxes (wages) are larger (lower) in North than in South in autarky. These discrepancies depend on the relative labor endowment and on µ. The higher the output elasticity of land, the lower the wages and the taxes in North compared to South, but these eects cancel out when considering the ratio of factor prices.
Gains from trade depend on each region's comparative advantage. Since North has a larger labor endowment while pollution levels are the same, relative factor abundance theory predicts that in trade, North specializes in labor-intensive agriculture whereas South specializes in pollution-intensive industry under H1. However, using (4) we obtain
As a consequence, North has a comparative advantage in industry i µ > ξ. If ξ > µ, southern countries have a comparative advantage in the GHG intensive industry and northern countries in agriculture.
Since ξ is decreasing in e, the more substitutable fossil fuels and bioenergy are, the more likely North has a comparative advantage in industry. Industry, however, must remain the most pollution intensive sector after substituting bioenergy for pollution. A higher GHG emissions rate in agriculture σ makes it easier for this condition to hold since the environmental tax is more stringent in agriculture. 14 µ > ξ leads to a steeper industrial iso-cost curve relative to the agricultural curve and corresponds
On the opposite, µ < ξ leads to a steeper iso-cost curve in agriculture than in industry, and we have Z M /L M > σZ A /L A under H1. As σ > 1, industry is more pollution intensive than agriculture in any case. Since land use is the same in both regions, agricultural iso-cost curves are identical. However, the industrial isocost curve of the region with a comparative advantage in industry is located below the other. In both situations, the factor price ratio (τ /w) is larger in North than in South.
This ambiguity in the patterns of trade has not received much attention, except in Copeland & Taylor (1997 , 2003 and Chua (2003) . Usually, trade liberalization will see South having a comparative advantage in the emission intensive good and North in the cleaner good. But the non-linearity of the emission due to land conversion implies that agriculture could have a atter iso-cost curve than in industry.
A higher environmental tax impacts both sectors through the input prices τ and τ A , but the resulting eect on the output relative price is intricate.
In industry, the rise in the energy prices implies that it is more costly to produce industrial goods even if it is possible to substitute bioenergy for fossil fuels. In agriculture, since τ A = τ ψ ′ (K A ), the land price is aected directly through the change in τ but also through the change in the demand for bioenergy which may result in a higher demand for land. When σ is large, the impact on the agricultural price of a higher tax exceeds the impact on the industrial price. Consequently, a tighter environmental policy induces a 14 Using (4), (8) and (14), the slopes of the iso-cost curves are given by (dτ /dw) 
decrease (a rise) in the relative price p when σ is large (small), which explains the potential for reversing comparative advantages.
Trade impacts on the environment
A rst appraisal of trade impacts on the environment is deduced from the sectorial emission demands (16) and (17) and the government pollution supply (15). Indeed, using the labor market equilibrium we get
which holds regardless of the country's openness to trade and whatever Z w .
Indicating with superscript t trade equilibrium values, we thus have The eects of trade on the emission patterns are derived using the iceberg cost approach (Samuelson, 1954) 15 To simplify computations, we assume that there is no friction in the transport of agricultural goods which also allows us to have the same numeraire in every countries.
c A (w, τ A ).
16 Consequently, using (14), we obtain the relative factor prices
where ν ≡ µ(σ − 1)/(µ − ξ) and ϑ ≡ ω From (5) and (10), we obtain that at the trade equilibrium 
tively, satisfy
Hence, the northern share of global income is a weighted sum of the northern shares of revenues from labor wages and from environmental taxes. Use of (14) and (25) gives the inverse pollution demand in trade:
Equalizing supply (15) and demand (26) of pollution, and using (22), gives
which, given (25) and θ = (µ − ξσ)φ + ξµ(σ − 1)/[σ(µ − ξ)], amount to a domestic pollution level satisfying
16 As ψ ′ (0) = 0, the land price is negligible when only low levels of land are involved and thus both regions produce the agricultural good. However, it may be the case that some countries specialize in agriculture.
Expressions similar to (27) and (28) are obtained for a southern country by replacing δ i by 1 − δ i , with i = Z, I, L, and we have
Finally, adding (29) and (30) and rearranging terms gives
Comparing (20) with (29) and (30) suggests that the emissions of a northern and a southern country are also decreasing with worldwide emission level (29), (30) and (31) reveals that the trade eects depend both on the discrepancies between µ and ξ and between δ Z and δ L . It is easily deduced from proposition 2 that δ Z = δ I = δ L under autarky, and thus that (20) is a particular case of both expressions (29) Proof: see the appendix.
Factor prices dier across regions under free trade, hence the FPE theorem does not hold in our context. Moreover, since North is richer than South in free trade, it has a greater carbon tax than South: τ > τ * , whatever the comparative advantage of each region. Figure 2 illustrates the free trade equilibrium, panel 2a corresponding to µ > ξ and panel 2b to ξ > µ. The industrial iso-cost curves are identical across regions whereas the agricultural iso-cost curves dier due to the difference in land use. When µ > ξ, South exploits its comparative advantage in agriculture, its iso-cost curve is thus lower than the northern one since the amount of productive land is higher in South. The situation is reversed when µ < ξ. As in gure 1, the factor price ratio is larger in North than in South in both cases.
Denoting by z a (Z w ), z t (Z w ) and z * t (Z w ) the LHS of (20), (29), (30) respectively, it is easily obtained that
From proposition 3 and using (32), we can infer that trade impacts on the environment depend on the comparative advantage of each region: ii/ If North (South) has a comparative advantage in agriculture (industry), northern emissions decrease, southern emissions increase, and the worldwide emission level increases.
Proof: see the appendix.
Given I > I * and (32), trade has a larger eect on southern emissions than on northern ones: compared to autarky, the variation of the GHG emissions in South more than compensate the change in North. If trade increases emissions in North, it also reduces more importantly emissions in South, leading to a decrease of worldwide emissions. Reciprocally, if trade reduces emissions in North, the large increase in emissions in South results in a larger level of GHG emissions worldwide. Figure 3 illustrates the case when northern emissions rise in trade (assuming n = n * in this gure): we have
, implying that trade reduces worldwide emissions (hence a resulting level Z wt < Z wa ). If North has a comparative advantage in industry, its total level of emissions is larger in trade than in autarky. Even though northern industries use more bioenergy than southern ones, the positive trade impact on the global environment owes more to the relocation of southern industries than to northern eorts in using more bioenergy. By contrast, when South has a comparative advantage in industry, trade deteriorates the global environment. Facing a lower environmental tax, southern industries use less bioenergy per unit of industrial good than northern ones. As a consequence, the demand for bioenergy inputs and the international market for bioenergy are likely to be small.
Conclusion
Trade of commodities and bioenergy has an impact on the environment which can be benecial if North has a comparative advantage in industry. In that case, the level of global GHG emissions is reduced compared to autarky, while it is increased if South is the most industrial region. These opposite impacts rest on dierences in environmental taxes, since the tax is higher in North than in South at equilibrium whatever the comparative advantage. When North is the industrial region, because of its more stringent environmental regulation, the reallocation of pollution-intensive industries in the northern countries result in an improved worldwide environmental situation. Hence, considering the quality of the environment in terms of GHG emission levels alone allows us to conclude on the positive impact of trade if North is the industrial region. This view, however, excludes other aspects of land use changes which are not accounted for in the GHG emissions, such as biodiversity loss, soil erosion and ecosystem disturbances.
We also assume that no country has the capability to inuence the terms of trade whereas a few countries dominate the bioenergy market currently.
18
A major exporter of bioenergy could benet from an increase in the relative price of these goods (Rauscher, 1994; Copeland & Taylor, 1995) and thus would have an incentive to increase its land tax while decreasing its carbon tax. As a result, the impacts of trade on the world pollution level would diminish when terms-of-trade eects are taken into account.
. We also have
and symmetrically,
These two equations and (28) for North and South lead to a ratio of land use K A /K * A thats solves at equilibrium:
Without trade frictions, ϑ = 1 and (A.3) can be expressed as
As ν = µ(σ − 1)/(µ − ξ), factor prices equalize only if K A = K * A . As Ω(1, 1) = 0, this is the case for L = L * . We rst show that this is the only case, i.e. Ω(1, ℓ) = 0 for all ℓ ∈ (0, 1). The condition Ω(1, ℓ) = 0 can be writtenĝ(1, ℓ) = 1. As ∂ĝ(k, ℓ) ∂ℓ = − ∂f (k, ℓ) ∂ℓ
(1/ξ − 1)(1 − k −ν ℓ)
where ∂f (k, ℓ) ∂ℓ = −f (k, ℓ) (n * /n)k −νξ 1 + (n * /n)ℓ/k νξ , we have ∂ĝ(1, ℓ) ∂ℓ =f (1, ℓ)
(1/ξ − 1)(1 − ℓ) (n * /n) 1 + (n * /n)ℓ + 1/ξ − 1 −f (1, ℓ)
where the bracketed term is positive if f (1, ℓ) < (1/ξ − 1) (1 − ℓ)(n * /n) 1 + (n * /n)ℓ + 1 = (1/ξ − 1) 1 + (n * /n) 1 + (n * /n)ℓ (1/ξ − 1)(1 − k −ν ℓ)
We thus havek ′ (1) > 0 (implying K A < K * A ) when ∂ĝ(1, 1)/∂ℓ > 0, i.e. when µ > ξ, and the opposite when µ < ξ. As K * A > K A and ν > 0 when µ > ξ and K * A < K A and ν < 0 when µ < ξ, we deduce from (23) and (24) that we always have τ > τ * and w < w * . From (13), it comes I > I * . 
